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executive summary 
 
Catch-22: Conservation, Communities and the 
Privatization of B.C. Fisheries investigates the 
economic, social and ecological impacts of 
federal fisheries licensing policy, especially 
those promoting individual fishing quotas 
(IFQs). Under an IFQ system, an individual or 
company owns a preset portion of the total 
allowable catch called an individual fishing 
quota. Quotas are bought, sold or traded like 
shares on a stock exchange. IFQs are 
considered a form of resource privatization. 
 
The Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) 
has implemented IFQs in the geoduck, halibut, 
sablefish, groundfish trawl and three shellfish 
fisheries. It is currently developing a 
controversial plan—opposed by many working 
fishermen and First Nations—to implement 
IFQs in B.C.’s salmon fishery. 
 
Many of the major reforms of B.C. fisheries in 
the 1990s, including the introduction of IFQ 
programs and the Mifflin Plan in the salmon 
industry, represented a catch-22 for fishing-
dependent communities. DFO’s solutions 
created as many economic, social and 
ecological problems as they solved.  
 
ECONOMIC IMPACT 
 
In the 1990s, Ottawa committed to reducing 
overcapitalization in the B.C. fishing industry 
in order to increase its economic viability and 
conserve fish stocks. Capitalization in the 
fishing industry takes two forms: investment 
in vessels and equipment, and investment in 
fishing licences and quotas. 
 
Through licence buybacks and licensing policy 
reforms, Ottawa cut the fishing fleet in half in 
the 1990s. In 1988, DFO estimated the capital 
investment in vessels and equipment for the 
salmon fleet was about $777 million (in 2003 
dollars). By 2003, the capital investment in the 
entire fishing fleet for all species was 
estimated to be $286 million.  
 
However, the decrease in the capital value of 
vessels and equipment was offset by the 
soaring capital value of licences and quota for 
most commercial fisheries. DFO policies that 
gave “windfall profits” to some fishermen and 
allowed for the consolidation and leasing of 
licences and quota, tax incentives and 
growing demand for allocations from First 
Nations and recreational fishermen, all 
contributed to an inflationary trend in licence 
and quota prices. 
 
Between 1994 and 2002, the prices of troll and 
gillnet salmon licences doubled while catches 
declined. Other fisheries experienced 
skyrocketing trends, too. The advertised price 
of halibut quota increased from $9 per pound 
in 1991 to $36 per pound in 2004. In fact, the 
quota fisheries such as halibut, sablefish and 
groundfish trawl are some of the most capital-
intensive fisheries in B.C. 
 
By 2003, the capital value of licences and 
quotas reached $1.8 billion. Vessels and 
equipment now make up only 14 percent of 
the total capitalization in the B.C. fishing 
industry. In the past, the problem was too 
many fishermen chasing too few fish, but 
today it has become too much money chasing 
too few fish. Overcapitalization in licence and 
quota has become the problem, especially in 
terms of social equity. 
 
Indeed, the extremely high market value of 
licences and quotas is well outside the reach 
of many rural working families, First Nations 
and younger fishermen. A fisherman now 
needs to be a millionaire to enter into most 
fisheries. 
 
SOCIAL IMPACTS  
 
With catches declining in some fisheries and 
the prices of licences and quota soaring, many 
fishermen have sold out either through 
government-funded licence retirement 
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programs or by selling their licences to fellow 
fishermen. 
 
Not surprisingly, many of those fishermen 
who sold out were in rural and Aboriginal 
communities. Because of lower incomes, 
limited economic opportunities and lower 
property values, rural fishermen have less 
access to capital than their urban 
counterparts. First Nations people face even 
more obstacles, since their incomes are 35 
percent lower than the B.C. average and 
unemployment rates are double. Additionally, 
many native people living on Indian reserves 
do not have fee-simple ownership of their 
homes and therefore cannot use home equity 
to borrow money to buy fishing licences or 
quotas.  
 
As a result, both rural and Aboriginal 
individual ownership of commercial fishing 
licences and quota has declined precipitously. 
Between 1994 and 2002, rural communities 
with a population of less than 10,000 lost 540 
licences in major fisheries such as groundfish, 
salmon and shellfish as a result of fleet 
downsizing and the sale of licences to urban 
areas. That’s almost half (45 percent) of all 
licences for major fisheries owned by rural 
people.  
 
The most resource-dependent rural regions are 
losing their connections to the sea because of 
the urbanization of the fishery. Local residents 
on the West Coast of Vancouver Island, for 
instance, only own two percent of all 
individual fishing quotas in B.C. The number 
is three percent in the North Island and nine 
percent in the North Coast. By contrast, 
residents of metropolitan Vancouver and 
Victoria own 44 percent of quotas. 
 
In effect, fisheries policy, whether intentional 
or not, is skewed in favour of urban-based 
corporations and individuals with greater 
access to capital and economic opportunities. 
Those communities most dependent on fishing 
for their economic lifeblood are being 
squeezed out of B.C.’s fisheries. 
 
ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS 
 
The conservation record of privatizing 
fisheries through individual fishing quotas is 
inconclusive. By giving fishermen a set 
individual quota, IFQs end the frenzied “race 
for fish.” However, IFQs can induce 
unsustainable behaviour by fishermen, 
including quota busting, poaching, throwing 
back low-priced fish (high-grading) and 
misreporting catches. These problems can be 
solved in part by onboard and dockside 
observers but add considerable costs to 
fishing. 
 
The U.S. National Research Council has 
concluded that “IFQs are not a conservation 
tool, they’re mainly an economic tool.” 
They’re about promoting economic efficiency. 
Setting a total allowable catch that is 
scientifically defensible and sustainable is one 
of the most important fisheries conservation 
measures. Privatizing fisheries through IFQs, 
however, raises some fundamental problems 
about how sustainable catch levels are set. 
 
First, IFQs create windfall profits for those 
who initially receive them, but create huge 
debt for new entrants who must buy the 
expensive quotas in order to fish. This capital 
investment puts pressure on the resource since 
fishermen lobby for higher catches to finance 
their large debt-loads. Previously, the problem 
was “too many fishermen chasing too few 
fish.” Today, the problem is becoming “too 
much money chasing too few fish.” Under 
such a scenario, short-term profits win out 
over long-term conservation as fishermen 
succumb to immediate financial pressures. 
 
Second, as part of their policy to privatize 
fishery resources, DFO has established co-
management agreements with exclusive 
groups of licence and quota holders, which 
has increased the influence of industry 
stakeholders. Conservation groups, 
communities, First Nations, and labour 
interests are marginalized, since fisheries 
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management becomes increasingly focused on 
maximizing the narrow economic returns of 
licence and quota holders. Economic interests 
must be balanced by community and 
conservation values. 
 
Third, as part of its privatization, DFO is 
shifting the cost and responsibility for stock 
assessment and other scientific data collection 
onto industry and private companies. This 
trend calls into question the ownership of data 
and the transparency of fisheries management 
and science. The lack of access to data is 
hampering the efforts of independent 
scientists and conservation groups to 
scrutinize DFO’s science and decision-making, 
especially annual catch levels. 
 
The privatization of B.C. fisheries has netted a 
catch-22: DFO’s solution has become the 
problem, worsening overcapitalization, 
undermining the sustainability of fishing-
dependent communities and compromising 
conservation for economic efficiency. It is 
time for a serious re-examination of current 
policy and a move towards new solutions that 
work towards the long-term health and 
viability of fishing-dependent communities 
and fish stocks. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1) Public Registry 
DFO should establish a public registry 
requiring individuals and companies to 
register all their leases, trades and sales of 
fishing licences and quota, and to fully 
disclose financial interests in these assets. The 
registry would allow the government, industry 
and public to monitor ownership and capital 
trends in the industry and to help protect 
against corporate concentration and 
overcapitalization. 
 
2) National Standards 
DFO should establish national standards for 
fishing licence and quota programs that would 
reduce overcapitalization in licences and 
quota, protect working crews from bearing the 
costs of quota leases, address unresolved First 
Nations rights, ensure that fair economic 
benefits are shared amongst various 
stakeholders and limit excessive consolidation 
and corporate concentration in the industry. 
 
3) Community Quota Entities 
DFO should permit the establishment of and 
provide funding for Community Quota Entities 
(CQEs), which would be non-profit societies 
established to hold fisheries licences and quota 
in trust for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
rural fishing communities. The CQEs would 
lease fishing privileges to local fishermen and 
facilitate new entrants into the industry.  
 
4) Public Data 
DFO should establish a comprehensive data-
access policy that provides full and 
transparent access to biological and catch data 
and thereby rebuild trust in DFO science and 
ensure rigorous review of fisheries decision-
making by independent scientists and the 
public. Furthermore, all fisheries data funded 
and collected by private companies as part of 
IFQ fisheries should be placed in the public 
domain.   
 
5) Fisheries Co-management 
DFO should ensure that diverse interests are 
represented in fisheries co-management 
agreements and harvesting committees 
including licence and quota holders, labour, 
processors, coastal communities, First Nations, 
environmentalists and other citizen groups. 
Economic interests should be balanced by 
social and ecological values. 
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research team 
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note on statistics 
 
Unless otherwise noted, data for this report 
were obtained from the DFO Pacific Fishery 
Licence Unit, DFO Catch Statistics Unit, on-
line landings statistics, and various 
publications and reports. Due to considerable 
challenges in obtaining complete time series 
of information for all fisheries, our analysis 
deals with the years 1994 and 2002—the two 
most complete years of data available to us, 
which also fall before and after several major 
regulatory and policy changes in B.C. 
fisheries. The comparative analysis for 1994 
and 2002 excludes the party-based, non-vessel 
licences (such as herring gillnet, intertidal 
clam, goose barnacle, herring bait and smelt 
fisheries), because the 1994 licence lists were 
not available from DFO. Financial figures have 
been converted to constant 2003 dollars, 
unless otherwise noted. 
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CHAPTER 1 
introduction  
 
Over the past decade, Canada’s Pacific fishery 
has undergone fundamental changes. A 
combination of factors—habitat degradation, 
overcapacity and overcapitalization, fish stock 
depletions, declines in ocean productivity and 
depressed global fish prices—have threatened 
the fishing industry’s viability. In response, 
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) 
introduced a sweeping set of policies to 
restructure and rationalize the industry. The 
objectives were two-fold: (1) to improve 
economic viability and (2) to impose stricter 
conservation measures including reduced 
bycatch, improved monitoring and the 
targeted protection of weak fish stocks.  
 
In part, these changes came as a result of 
severe federal government restraint.1 In the 
1995 federal budget then-Finance Minister 
Paul Martin committed to privatizing many of 
the responsibilities and services of DFO by 
entering “into partnerships with the fishing 
industry and others in the management of 
capacity, licensing and compliance.”2 The 
objectives of cutting DFO’s budget, increasing 
revenues through new user fees and 
downloading responsibilities to the fishing 
industry were well served by privatization.  
 
This report, however, focuses on the impact of 
these policy reforms on communities and 
conservation. We begin by reviewing the 
history of federal fisheries licensing policy and 
the growing shift to privatized models of 
fisheries ownership and management. The 
study looks at how these policy reforms have 
changed the economics of fishing. Have 
fisheries reforms reduced or increased 
overcapitalization in the fishing industry? We 
then explore the social impacts in terms of 
distribution of wealth, especially to rural and 
Aboriginal communities. How have DFO 
policy reforms affected fishermen in rural 
communities and Aboriginal participation in 
fisheries?  
 
Our research employs a novel approach, using 
GIS (Geographic Information Systems) to 
investigate the spatial patterns of licence 
ownership, effectively mapping the 
socioeconomics of B.C. fisheries. The final 
section of the report deals with conservation. 
What are the long-term ecological 
implications of this policy reform on fish 
stocks? Does privatizing the ownership of 
fisheries resources promote conservation?  
 
Our analysis is based on DFO’s licensing and 
catch landings data from 1994 to 2002, a 
survey of the market value of fishing licences 
and a review of relevant academic research 
and published reports. Using this data and 
information, we address the economic, social 
and ecological impacts of fisheries licensing 
policy in B.C.  
 
We do so in the spirit of provoking a broad-
based public discussion about the future of 
our ocean resources and to provide 
governments, fishermen, First Nations, coastal 
communities and the public at large with both 
data and analysis that will contribute to a 
better understanding of fisheries policy. Our 
report is also a challenge to decision-makers 
to conduct thorough and comprehensive 
impact analysis of policy options in fisheries 
prior to implementation. We caution that our 
report is only a beginning and invite 
discussion, debate and further research and 
analysis on these issues that are critical to the 
'Many of the major reforms of 
B.C. fisheries in the 1990s 
represented a catch-22 for 
communities: The solutions 
became, in effect, part of the 
problem.' 
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survival of our ocean resources and coastal 
communities. 
 
Our analysis shows that many of the major 
reforms of B.C. fisheries in the 1990s 
represented a catch-22 for communities: The 
solutions became, in effect, part of the 
problem. Far from reducing over-
capitalization in fisheries, DFO policies 
exacerbated the problem and instead of 
increasing the economic viability of coastal 
communities, the rationalization, restructuring 
and ultimately privatization of B.C. fisheries 
marginalized Aboriginal fishermen and rural 
regions. Poor regions have become even 
poorer.  
 
Despite the commitment stated in Canada’s 
Oceans Strategy that coastal communities “be 
actively involved in the development, 
promotion, and implementation of sustainable 
oceans activities,”3 our report reveals that 
quite the opposite is true. As far as 
commercial fisheries are concerned, coastal 
communities are less involved than a decade 
ago. 
 
Human communities are part of the rich 
diversity of B.C.’s marine ecosystem. 
Recognizing the importance of the connection 
of coastal people to the sea, the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea calls upon 
states to consider the “economic needs of 
coastal fishing communities” 4 and the Food 
and Agriculture Organization’s Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries recognizes 
“the important contributions of artisanal and 
small-scale fisheries to employment, income 
and food security” in fishing-dependent 
communities, which should receive 
“preferential access” to fisheries.5 
 
A thriving coastal economy and bustling rural 
communities, social justice and the righting of 
historic wrongs for First Nations, abundant 
fish stocks and pristine marine ecosystems—
these are the tangible benchmarks by which 
we must measure our success to manage our 
ocean resources. The ocean is part of 
humanity’s common wealth. With this in 
mind, we have provided in this report some 
practical and innovative recommendations to 
enhance conservation and to re-engage 
coastal communities in the ownership and 
management of our common-property ocean 
resources.  
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CHAPTER 2 
fisheries: public trust or 
private property? 
 
Fish, by nature, are a common property. They 
are largely undomesticated animals and swim 
indifferently across the world’s borders. Their 
home—the ocean—is a common pool, defying 
bureaucratic boxes, legal jurisdictions, 
economic theories, and physical barriers. This 
has created a challenge for fisheries managers 
throughout history.  
 
Under British common law, the Crown has 
provided the public with a right to tidal 
fisheries dating back to the Magna Carta in 
1215 AD.  In Canada, the federal government, 
on behalf of the Crown, has legal authority to 
manage fisheries in the public interest.   
 
Canadian federal authority, however, is 
balanced with First Nations’ title and rights.  
Through various decisions, including R. vs. 
Delgamuukw and R. vs. Sparrow, among 
others, courts have defined Aboriginal title as 
a sui generis collective property right, 
meaning British common law and Canadian 
constitutional law need to be reconciled with 
the prior occupation of First Nations. 
Aboriginal title involves several issues—how 
the land and ocean resources are managed and 
used, the right to exclusive use or occupation, 
and the question of “fair” economic benefit 
from resource use. In addition to rights to fish 
for food, social and ceremonial purposes, First 
Nations have established rights to fish for 
economic purposes (R. vs. Gladstone).  The 
extent of First Nations’ rights and title are the 
subject of on-going litigation and negotiation. 
 
Subject to certain conditions, including 
conservation measures and the 
aforementioned First Nations rights, the 
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans grants a 
fishing licence to a person (an individual or a 
company) to harvest a certain species of fish.  
Legally, a fishing licence is not a permanent 
authorization or right to fish nor a permanent 
grant of fish. It is a privilege granted on an 
annual basis. The courts have confirmed that 
under the Fisheries Act, “the Minister has 
absolute discretion in determining the 
issuance of licences.”6 
 
For much of the twentieth century, the 
Minister granted fishing licences to any 
citizen who wanted to fish. The only 
exceptions were, at times, racial restrictions 
placed on Aboriginal people and immigrants 
of Asian descent. Otherwise, any Canadian 
was free to participate, commercially or 
recreationally, in fishing. By the 1960s, 
however, this open-access system became 
untenable. There were simply too many 
fishermen chasing too few fish in largely 
unregulated, highly competitive derby 
fisheries. There was a need for stricter 
government control. 
 
LIMITED ENTRY 
 
In 1969, Ottawa imposed limited entry in the 
commercial salmon industry in B.C., 
restricting access to vessels that historically 
participated in the salmon fishery. Under the 
“Davis Plan,” named after Fisheries Minister 
Jack Davis at the time, any fishing vessel that 
caught 10,000 pounds or more of salmon in 
either 1967 or 1968 was granted a licence. A 
total of 5,870 salmon or “A” licences were 
issued.  In 1974, herring licences were 
similarly limited.  Limited entry ended the 
'Legally, a fishing licence is 
not a permanent authorization 
or right to fish nor a 
permanent grant of fish. It is a 
privilege granted on an 
annual basis.' 
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open access nature of commercial fishing in 
B.C.  
 
In 1977, Canada extended its jurisdiction 200 
nautical miles offshore and asserted control 
over fisheries in its territorial waters, the so-
called Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  With 
expansion of domestic fishing capacity, 
Ottawa imposed limited entry in several other 
fisheries by the early 1980s: halibut, 
groundfish trawl, geoduck, abalone, spawn-
on-kelp and sablefish. A decade later, there 
was limited entry in almost every commercial 
fishery in B.C.   
 
In 1969 the estimated value of the salmon 
fleet was $483 million (in 2003 dollars), 
reflecting the value of vessels and equipment.7  
With the introduction of the Davis Plan, 
however, the value soared. Although a licence 
was still—by legal definition—only an annual 
permit to fish, the government allowed 
fishermen to buy, sell and transfer them. 
Fishing licences, despite their legal definition 
as a privilege granted by the Minister, took on 
some of the characteristics of private property: 
they acquired a market value and became a 
tradable asset. Indeed, a fishing licence 
became a very valuable asset, especially as 
prices for salmon and herring rose in the 
1970s.  
 
By 1988, the estimated market value of the 
salmon fishing fleet (including vessels, 
equipment and licences) was $1.7 billion. 
More than half of that, or $902 million, 
reflected the value of the fleet’s licences. 
Taking inflation into account, the capital 
value of the fleet increased more than 
threefold in 20 years.8  With virtually no limits 
on licence transferability and growing 
investment in new vessels and technology, 
capitalization in the industry soared. 
 
 
 
 
INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS 
 
Responding to overcapitalization and excess 
capacity issues in the fishing fleet, in 1982 Dr. 
Peter Pearse, then chairman of the Royal 
Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy, 
recommended that Ottawa go further in 
formalizing private property rights through a 
new licensing regime. The proposed remedy 
had the same objective as in the 1960s: to 
reduce the fleet by excluding some fishermen 
while granting more secure fishing rights to 
others. Pearse recommended that DFO not 
only give fewer licences, but also give selected 
licence holders a pre-defined portion of the 
available fish. Individual fishing quotas, or 
IFQs, would grant an exclusive right to an 
individual or company to fish a certain 
percentage of the total allowable catch (TAC) 
of a fish species in a specific geographic area. 
Quotas would supposedly end the competitive 
nature of fisheries. 
 
Pearse’s proposal went further. He proposed 
that licence holders be able to buy, sell, lease 
and trade quota without restriction, making 
quotas fully transferable. This is known as an 
individual transferable quota (ITQ) system. As 
fishermen buy and sell licences, according to 
economic theory, larger, more efficient 
operators would buy out smaller ones, 
overcapitalization would decrease, and the 
fleet would become smaller and more 
manageable. (Pearse recently repeated this 
proposal in his co-authored federal-provincial 
report on the salmon fishery, Treatise and 
Transition: Towards a Sustainable Fishery on 
Canada’s Pacific Coast.9  In this latest version, 
'The idea that fish should be 
privately owned and bought 
and sold like shares in the 
stock market is a radical 
departure from the notion of 
fish as common property.' 
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TABLE 1: Commercial Fishing Licences and Major Policy Reforms 
 
 
 
 
 
Licence 
 
Year of limited 
entry 
 
 
Major licensing reforms 
 
Number of 
licences 
 
Quota Fisheries 
   
Abalone Closed 1977 Quota system in 1979; Closed for 
conservation reasons in 1990 
26 
Geoduck G 1979 Quota system in 1989 55 
Sablefish K 1981 Quota system in 1990 48 
Halibut L 1979 Quota system in 1991 436 
Red Sea Urchin ZC 1991 Quota system in 1994 110 
Green Sea Urchin ZA 1991 Quota system in 1995 49 
Sea Cucumber ZD 1991 Quota system in 1995 85 
Groundfish Trawl T 1979 Quota system in 1997 142 
 
Non-Quota Fisheries 
   
Salmon A 1969 Mifflin Plan in 1996 2,220 
Herring HS / HG 1974 In 1979, an owner-operator provision was 
dropped and in 1991 the licence became 
transferable. Today, fishermen form licence 
pools that are assigned quotas, although the 
fishery is not considered an IFQ program. 
252 / 1,257 
Prawn W 1990 Trap limits in 1995 251 
Crab R 1991 Licence retirement program in 1997 222 
Clam Z2 1998 1989 introduced area licensing 1,146 
Rockfish Hook and 
Line 
ZN 1991-1992 Catches were cut by 50% in 2002 and 89 
Rockfish Conservation Areas were 
established in 2004. 
262 
Shrimp S 1969 Fishery began in 1960s as part of A license. 
Mifflin Plan allowed separation of A from S 
licence. 
247 
SOURCE: Information on licensing policies obtained from DFO’s homepage and various fisheries management plans. 
he emphasizes the concept that licences 
should be long-term tenures rather than 
annual privileges. This would further entrench 
private property rights in the fishery.) 
 
The idea that fish should be privately owned 
and bought and sold like shares in the stock 
market is a radical departure from the notion 
of fish as common property. Nevertheless, the 
idea of privatizing fisheries through tradable 
quotas has gained prominence.  Some 
fishermen and fishing companies who stood to 
gain a “windfall profit” from the initial grant 
of quotas promoted privatization. Senior DFO 
officials, who saw an opportunity to offload 
management costs and responsibilities onto 
industry and meet their budget reduction 
targets, also supported privatization. Others, 
such as the Fraser Institute, trumpeted quotas 
for ideological reasons, believing that a free-
market approach to managing natural 
resources would optimize economic benefits 
and ensure conservation.10 
 
In 1989, DFO published a strategic outlook, 
Vision 2000: A Vision of Pacific Fisheries at 
the Beginning of the 21st Century, which 
announced a “move towards property rights 
concept for all fisheries.”11 Soon after, DFO 
implemented individual transferable quotas in 
the geoduck, sablefish and halibut fisheries.  
 
SALMON DILEMMA 
 
Salmon, however, were problematic and not 
so easily moved into a quota system. In 1994, 
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there were 4,415 salmon licences, divided 
among seiners, gillnetters and trollers, which 
caught five species of salmon from more than 
4,000 distinct stocks spawning in some 1,500 
streams and rivers. Salmon stock levels 
fluctuate wildly, forcing DFO managers to 
upgrade or downgrade the salmon runs and 
allowable catches during the fishing season. It 
would be logistically difficult, perhaps even 
impossible, to assign individual quotas to each 
fisherman for each species for each river, and 
adjust these in-season. Salmon stocks were 
nevertheless declining and excessive fishing 
capacity threatened the resource. A different 
solution was sought in 1996 with the 
introduction of the Pacific Salmon 
Revitalization Strategy, known as the Mifflin 
Plan, named after then-Fisheries Minister Fred 
Mifflin. 
 
The Mifflin Plan involved three elements: an 
$80-million licence retirement or “buyback” 
program, single gear licensing which restricted 
fishermen to one kind of gear only, and area 
licensing which further restricted fishermen to 
one of two seine areas, or one of three gillnet 
or troll areas. If fishermen wanted to fish in 
another area or with different gear, they 
would have to buy out a fellow fisherman and 
”stack” the licence on their vessel. The 
stacking provision would further rationalize 
the fleet. Following Pearse’s argument, 
fishermen with more efficient boats—and more 
money—would buy out smaller, marginal 
operators.  
 
GROUNDFISH TRAWL IFQS 
 
The following year DFO reformed the 
groundfish trawl fishery, implementing 
individual transferable quotas. At 
approximately 140,000 tonnes in annual 
landings, groundfish trawling is the largest 
fishery by volume in B.C. It equals about 60 
percent of the total landed weight of all 
fisheries in B.C.  There are 55 area-specific 
species quotas in the fishery and through a 
system of buying, selling, trading and leasing 
the fleet was rationalized to some 60 to 80 
working vessels from 142. A Groundfish 
Development Authority (GDA), representing 
community and labour interests, was also 
established to provide advice to the Minister 
regarding 20 percent of the quota allocations.  
 
The privatization of the trawl fishery also saw 
the establishment of a commercial quota 
registry. According to its website, A to Z 
Quota Registry is “sort of like a small stock 
exchange. Vessel and licence holders register 
their quotas, vessels, licences, and equipment 
with our company, and we try and match 
buyers with sellers, or those interested in 
trading quota. When a match is found we 
collect either a service charge or commission 
from the participants.”12 Thus, B.C.’s first 
private fish stock exchange—with buyers, 
sellers and brokers—was created. 
 
RESOURCE PRIVATIZATION 
 
What has been the cumulative effect of all 
these licensing policy reforms? More than 30 
years after the introduction of the Davis Plan, 
the B.C. fishery is being consolidated and 
increasingly privatized. By 2003, 63 percent of 
all commercial fisheries, by weight, were 
managed as quota fisheries (not including roe 
herring which involves licence pools and 
quotas, but is not formally considered an IFQ 
fishery); the ratio is 49 percent by landed 
value.  
 
Participation in commercial fisheries—with the 
exception of special non-transferable native 
'More than 30 years after the 
introduction of the Davis Plan, 
the B.C. fishery is being 
consolidated and increasingly 
privatized.' 
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FIGURE 1: Privatization of B.C. Fisheries
Landings of Quota* & Non-quota Fisheries, 2003
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SOURCE: DFO Commercial Catch Statistics homepage. 
NOTE: Approximately $8 million (or 10%) of the groundfish landed value is caught in non-quota fisheries 
including Schedule II and rockfish hook and line fisheries. Because DFO does not publish data on landed 
catches for specific fisheries, these catches have been included in the quota fisheries for this chart. 
 
and clam licences—is dependent on how much 
money one has. Access to capital has become 
the ultimate requisite for a successful 
fisherman. According to the A to Z Quota 
Registry, participation in commercial fishing 
“is just a matter of money.” 13 
 
B.C.’s fisheries are being managed to 
maximize the returns of licence and quota 
holders—if not the de jure then the de facto 
owners of the fish in the ocean—while 
marginalizing or simply ignoring the interests 
of First Nations, crews, shore workers, marine 
suppliers and the broader socio-economic 
interests of rural communities. Ocean 
resources are shifting from being a public trust 
managed for the benefit of all Canadians to 
private property managed in the narrow 
interest of exclusive groups of licence and 
quota holders. This privatization of a public 
resource has fundamentally changed the 
economics of fishing and significantly skewed 
who participates in and benefits from 
Canada’s Pacific fisheries. 
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TABLE 2: Estimation of Licence and Quota Market Values by B.C. Fishery 
 
Fishery (Licence) 
 
No. of 
Licences 
 
Value / 
Licence ($) 
 
Total Licence 
Value ($) 
 
Quota 
Value ($) 
 
Fishery Value 
Licence + Quota ($) 
SALMON      
Seine (AS) 266 $361,880 $96,260,000 - $96,260,000 
Gillnet (AG) 1075 82,767 88,975,000 - 88,975,000 
Troll (AT) 520 99,115 51,540,000 - 51,540,000 
Salmon Total   236,775,000 - 236,775,000 
      
HERRING      
Seine (HS) 251 709,462 178,075,000 - 178,075,000 
Gillnet (HG) 1250 140,564 175,705,000 - 175,705,000 
Spawn on kelp (J) 37 925,000 34,225,000 - 34,225,000 
Herring total   388,005,000 - 388,005,000 
      
GROUNDFISH      
Trawl (T) 142 81,900 11,629,800 267,622,500 279,252,300 
Halibut (L) 410 46,860 19,212,600 317,250,000 336,462,600 
Sablefish (k) 47 190,000 8,930,000 139,568,817 148,498,817 
Rockfish (ZN) 248 101,782 25,242,000 - 25,242,000 
Schedule II (C) 527 20,400 10,750800  10,750,800 
Groundfish total   75,765,200 724,441,317 789,455,717 
      
SHELLFISH      
Crab (R) 213 352,000 74,976,000 - 74,976,000 
Prawn (W) 247 438,000 108,186,000 - 108,186,000 
Shrimp (S) 235 49,200 11,562,000 - 11,562,000 
Geoduck (G) 55 3,000,000 165,000,000 - 165,000,000 
Red Urchin (ZC) 104 235,000 24,440,000 - 24,440,000 
Green Urchin (ZA) 49 40,000 1,960,000 - 1,960,000 
Sea Cucumber (ZD) 85 100,000 8,500,000 - 8,500,000 
Euphausiid (ZF) 18 75,000 1,350,000  1,350,000 
TOTAL FISHERIES   $1,096,519,200 $724,441,317 1,820,960,517 
 
SOURCE: Nelson Bros Fisheries Ltd, Licence Values in the Pacific Fishing Fleet, report prepared for DFO, March 31, 2003. 
Values are approximately December 31, 2002 and exclude AI, F and N licence categories. 
CHAPTER 3 
economic impacts: fishing for 
millionaires 
 
Capital investment in the B.C. fishing fleet has 
soared since 1969.14 Investment has taken two 
forms. The first category is investment in 
vessels and equipment. As earnings grew in 
the 1970s, fishermen reinvested in their 
operations to increase their fishing efficiency. 
Vessels became bigger, more powerful and 
faster to increase their catching capacity in 
the race for the fish. Many boats were 
retrofitted with bigger holds, better motors, 
keener electronics and refrigeration to freeze 
fish at sea. The fishing fleet had far more 
catching capacity than could be supported by 
sustainable harvest levels. 
 
The second category is investment in licences 
and quotas. Increased earnings and more 
catching capacity, combined with limited 
entry, created a lucrative market for fishermen 
to buy and sell their commercial fishing 
privileges. These investments, in fact, became 
larger than investment in vessels and 
equipment. From 1969 to 1988, the total 
market value of the fleet (including vessels, 
equipment and licences) jumped by 360 
percent. More than half this reflected the 
enormous value of licences, largely salmon 
and herring—the coast’s two most lucrative 
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fisheries.15 Both categories of capital 
investment grew and lead to 
overcapitalization in the fishing industry. 
 
A 1986 report by the Auditor General of 
Canada identified several negative 
consequences of DFO’s licensing policy.16 
According to the Auditor General, although 
the number of fishing boats declined from 
6,600 to 4,400 over a 15-year period, “the 
catching capability of the total fleet has 
increased dramatically through upgrading 
vessels under existing licences or by 
technological improvements.”17 
 
Furthermore, the Auditor General concluded 
that, “the high level of investment in fleet 
capacity in relation to the value of the 
fisheries resource makes it difficult for 
fishermen to earn an adequate return on their 
investment income and creates financial 
difficulties when there are poor fishing 
seasons, price declines, or interest rate 
increases.”18 As a result, “the risk of over-  
fishing has increased substantially in the past 
decade.” The risk was reality. The Auditor 
General noted declining fish stocks and 
consistent over-fishing.  
 
By 1995, salmon stocks and prices had 
declined to the point where the fishing fleet in 
B.C. began to lose money in terms of pre-tax 
income. The Mifflin Plan was designed to 
increase the fleet’s economic viability. 
Between 1996 and 2000, the combined effect 
of the licence retirement program and licence 
stacking cut the fleet by 54 percent, reducing 
capital investment in vessels and equipment 
proportionately. By 1997, the number of jobs 
lost in the salmon industry was 6,445.19 
 
However, a report commissioned by the BC 
Job Protection Commission found that the 
Mifflin Plan’s buyback and new licensing 
provisions doubled the market value of 
licences, even in the face of declining 
catches.20  
 
RISING MARKET VALUES 
 
Indeed, licence values have increased across 
the board for almost all fisheries, especially in 
the salmon and groundfish IFQ fisheries. DFO 
set out to reduce overcapitalization in the 
fishing industry, but its policies have had the 
opposite effect on the capital value of licences 
and quotas.  
 
A survey of average sale prices (in 2003 
dollars) advertised in various maritime 
publications (including The West Coast 
Fishermen and Fishermen Life) provides a 
relative comparison of the growing 
capitalization in fishing licences and quotas. 
Between 1994 (before the Mifflin Plan) and 
2002, the average advertised sale value of a 
gillnet salmon licence doubled, while the 
landed value per licence dropped by 60 
percent. The sale value of troll salmon licences 
went up by 123 percent while the average 
catch per licence dropped 48 percent.  
 
Although the Mifflin Plan was supposed to 
reduce capitalization in the fleet by reducing 
the number of boats, it had the opposite effect 
since licence values soared. It became more 
expensive than ever to become a salmon 
fisherman. Gillnet and troll licences were 
worth more than five times the value of their 
annual landed catch (See Figures 2A and 2B).  
'A 1986 report by the 
Auditor-General of Canada 
identified several negative 
consequences of DFO’s 
licensing policy.' 
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FIGURE 2A and 2B: The difference between the purchase price (sale 
value) of a licence and the average landed catch value per licence for 
gillnet and troll salmon fisheries for the years 1994, 1998 and 2002. In 
1994, salmon troll and gillnet licences were the same licence, but were 
split into separate licence types and licence areas in 1996. The sale 
values per licence were calculated using advertised licence prices per 
foot multiplied by the average licence length in each year. The catch 
value was taken from DFO catch statistics. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2A: Salmon Troll Licences
$0
$20,000
$40,000
$60,000
$80,000
$100,000
$120,000
$140,000
1994 1998 2002
year
value per 
licence
Sale Value
Catch Value
 
FIGURE 2B: Salmon Gillnet Licences
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Figure 3: Quota Market Value
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Other fisheries, especially those with IFQ 
programs, experienced inflationary trends too. 
The advertised price of halibut quota, for 
example, increased from $9 per pound in 1991 
(the first year of the quota system) to $27 per 
adjusted for inflation. By 2004, the price of  
pound in 2002, a three-fold increase when one 
pound of halibut quota reached $36. (See 
Figure 3). A similar trend occurred with 
sablefish quota, which was advertised in the 
West Coast Fishermen in 1990 (the first year 
of the quota system) for $7.86 per pound, but 
is valued now between $40 and $50 per 
pound. 
 
Two factors contributed, in part, to the 
increase in the market value of halibut quota: 
first, harvesting costs decreased since fewer 
boats and crews fished the stock, and second, 
the landed value rose more from $21 million 
in 1990 to $39 million in 1999, an 84 percent 
increase, due to higher catches and prices.21 
Still, larger landings, better prices and lower 
costs do not account for most of the 300 
percent increase in the market value of quota. 
 
Other factors have had a significant effect on 
market values, including “windfall profits,” 
tax subsidies, licence stacking, quota leasing, 
and increasing demand for shrinking supply.   
 
"WINDFALL PROFITS" 
 
The granting or gifting of licences and quota 
creates “windfall profits” for those who 
received them. In most cases, the allocation of 
licences and quota cost nothing to the initial 
recipients and represented “a giveaway of 
public resources.”22  
 
New entrants to fisheries must now buy these 
licences and quota to gain access to the 
resource. The market value paid to the initial 
recipient represents a windfall profit since 
these recipients  initially acquired the licence 
or quota at no cost.23 Nowadays, a geoduck 
quota licence is worth $3 million.  The 
average sablefish licence and quota holder 
owns an asset worth $3.2 million. And the 
average halibut licence and quota holder has 
an $820,000 asset.  
 
TAX INCENTIVES 
 
Many of those who were initially granted 
licences and quota at no cost and have thus 
earned themselves a windfall profit have 
reinvested their earnings in the fishery by 
buying more licences and quota. The tax 
system encourages this consolidation by 
making licence and quota purchases tax 
deductible. The initial windfall profit and 
subsequent buying and selling of licences and 
quota, encouraged by tax incentives, 
capitalized the fishery unlike never before. 
 
LICENCE STACKING 
 
Fisheries policy reform in the later 1990s 
created inflationary markets for licences and 
quota. The Mifflin Plan, for instance, 
encourage those remaining in the salmon 
industry to buy more licences to remain 
viable. A small-boat fisherman could “stack” 
multiple licences on a single vessel under the 
scheme. Many fishermen did just that. In 
1994, 81 percent of salmon fishermen only 
owned one salmon licence; in 2002, that 
number declined to 52 percent.  
 
Fisheries policies that permit “stacking” 
increase the market value of licences. It 
encourages the consolidation of the industry 
and economies of scale. According to one 
study, “Each dollar of fisheries revenue for 
which licences can be stacked has much 
greater profit potential than a dollar of 
revenue for unstackable licences. The reason is 
that the revenue from the additional licence(s) 
does not have to go to serving fixed costs, 
such as vessel insurance and repairs. This 
greater profit potential, in turn, is translated 
into a higher licence value.”24 The study found 
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that the market value of “stackable” licences 
(such as salmon) is three to six times the 
annual landed value per licence, while the 
market value of non-stackable licences are on 
par with annual catches. This is consistent 
with our findings for small-boat salmon 
licences: market values are about five times 
the annual landed value for each licence. (See 
Figures 3A and 3B.) 
 
QUOTA LEASING 
 
Quotas can also be stacked in that fishermen 
can accumulate quota on a single vessel and 
increase their efficiency through economies of 
scale. Fishermen can also stack quota on a 
derelict vessel that never gets used, and then 
lease the quota to a bona fide working 
fishermen. Fully transferable quotas encourage 
leasing whereby a quota holder rents quota to 
a working fishermen for a fee. Leasing fees, 
especially in the B.C. halibut fishery, have 
been as high as 70 to 80 percent of the 
revenue from the landed catch, which is 
similar to anecdotal evidence in Atlantic 
Canada.25  
 
It’s a lucrative arrangement for quota holders, 
since their economic returns are often secured 
through pre-season agreements irrespective of 
the fluctuating market price for the fish. 
Furthermore, quota holders bear no risk to 
property or personal injury from fishing, a 
dangerous occupation even during fair 
weather. Leasing—often done privately and 
informally—further increased the market value 
of IFQs, making them valuable, revenue-
generating assets without the costs and risks 
of operating a vessel. 
 
INCREASING DEMAND, SHRINKING SUPPLY 
 
Another factor contributing to the rising 
market value for commercial fishing privileges 
is growing demand, especially in the face of 
declining stocks (decreasing supply) in many 
fisheries. Allocation disputes among 
recreational, commercial and Aboriginal 
fishermen have become more acrimonious as a 
result.  
 
Over the past three decades, many of those 
fishermen initially excluded in limited-entry 
licensing were First Nation fishermen.26 To 
address this loss of access, the government has 
chosen to purchase some licences back from 
commercial fishermen and reissue them to 
First Nations through the Northern Native 
Fishing Corporation or band-held, non-
transferable communal licences.27  
 
There is now growing demand for more 
native-held licences. In 2004, the Aboriginal 
Fisheries Commission’s First Nation Panel on 
Fisheries recommended, “Canada take 
immediate steps to allocate to First Nations a 
minimum 50 per cent share of all fisheries, 
with the understanding that this may 
eventually reach 100 per cent in some 
fisheries.”28 Similar demands for an increased 
share of fisheries resources are also being 
made in modern treaty negotiations and 
litigation by coastal and in-river tribes. There 
is also growing demand from recreational 
fishermen for more fish. 
 
Realizing the growing demand for fisheries 
allocations, many commercial fishermen have 
supported IFQs to secure their ownership over 
fisheries and thus ensure they are adequately 
'Windfall profits, tax incentives, 
fisheries policy that encourages 
licence stacking and quota 
leasing and growing demands 
by First Nations and 
recreational fishermen for 
allocations have all contributed 
to the rising price of fishing 
licences and quota.' 
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TABLE 3: Relative Capitalization in B.C. Fisheries (values in 2003 dollars) 
 
capitalization (market value) 
of licences and quota
annual landed value 
(4-year average)
capital-revenue
ratios
Groundfish Trawl (T)* $         279,252,300 $         29,905,607 9.4
Roe Herring (HS, HG)  $         353,780,000  $        41,933,105 8.4
Halibut (L) ** $         336,462,600 $         42,461,839 7.9
Sablefish (K) $         148,498,817 $         22,446,086 6.6
Sea Cucumber (ZD)  $             8,500,000 $           1,695,599 5.0
Salmon (AS, AG, AT)   $        236,775,000 $         50,618,718 4.7
Geoduck (G)  $         165,000,000 $         38,249,803 4.3
Prawn (W)  $         108,186,000 $         29,274,835 3.7
Green Urchin (ZA)  $             1,960,000 $              589,395 3.3
Spawn on Kelp (J)*** $           34,225,000 $         10,388,177 3.3
Red Urchin (ZC)  $           24,440,000 $           7,734,792 3.2
Shrimp (S)  $           11,562,000 $           4,694,994 2.5
Crab (R)  $           74,976,000  $         32,201,313 2.3
 
SOURCE: Most landed values for species are from DFO’s Commercial Catch Statistics homepage (http://www.pac.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/pages/data_e.htm) with some exceptions footnoted below; and capitalization levels are from Nelson Bros Fisheries Ltd, 
Licence Values in the Pacific Fishing Fleet, report prepared for DFO, March 31, 2003. 
* Groundfish Trawl T licence landed values (excluding hake) have been calculated from landed weights and prices per pound 
obtained from DFO and Living Oceans Society. Hake landed values have been obtained from DFO’s statistics homepage. 
According to these calculations, the average landed value is about $30 million, significantly lower than the $65 million stated on 
DFO’s Groundfish Trawl homepage. The report authors have submitted this data to DFO’s Groundfish Unit for clarification and 
thus the landed value may change pending DFO’s response. 
** Halibut L licence landed values do not include non-halibut species such as various rockfish which are caught and sold by L 
licence holders. Rockfish species make up more than 10 percent of the landed weight of the L licence catch.  
*** Spawn-on-kelp J licence landed values came from the B.C. Spawn-on-Kelp Association and are about 20 percent lower than 
the export values recorded on DFO’s Commercial Catch Statistics homepage. 
 
compensated if licences and quota are bought 
and transferred to First Nations through 
treaties. This has added the dynamic of 
speculative investment, a problem that DFO 
has recognized but apparently ignored. In 
1994, an internal DFO memo from then-
Assistant Deputy Minister Pat Chamut stated 
“the creation of IQs [individual quotas] creates 
disproportionate wealth for those who receive 
them… It has become evident that the 
adoption of IQs and the associated windfall 
profits that they will generate for fishermen 
will significantly increase the costs of future 
land claim settlements.”29  
 
Realizing this problem, the First Nations Panel 
on Fisheries has recently renewed calls that “a 
moratorium be placed on the further 
introduction of individual property rights 
regimes such as Individual Fishing Quotas 
(IFQs) unless First Nation interests including 
allocations in those fisheries are first 
addressed.”30 
 
Windfall profits, tax incentives, fisheries 
policy that encourages licence stacking and 
quota leasing and growing demands by First 
Nations and recreational fishermen for 
allocations have all contributed to inflationary 
trends in the price of commercial fishing 
licences and quota. 
 
MEASURING CAPITALIZATION 
 
How can capitalization in fishing quotas and 
licences be measured? One means to compare 
the relative capitalization of one fishery to 
another is to calculate the ratio of the market 
value of licences and quota (capitalization) to 
the annual landed value in the fishery 
(revenue). It is a rough measure since it does 
not take into account the different operating 
costs and capital costs of vessels and 
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equipment for each fishery. Keeping this in 
mind, however, capital-to-revenue ratios have 
been calculated for B.C. fisheries in Table 3.  
 
A higher ratio indicates a relatively higher 
level of capitalization in the fishery’s licences 
and quotas. The fisheries with the lowest 
capitalization ratios tend to be non-IFQ, non-
stackable or have a low landed value. 
 
In the 1990s, Ottawa committed to reducing 
overcapitalization in the B.C. fishing industry 
in order to increase its economic viability and 
conserve fish stocks. Through licence 
buybacks and licensing policy reforms, Ottawa 
cut the fishing fleet in half. In 1988, DFO 
estimated the capital investment in vessels and 
equipment for the salmon fleet was about 
$777 million (in 2003 dollars). By 2003, the 
capital investment in the entire B.C. fishing 
fleet for all species was estimated to be $286 
million. 
 
However, the decrease in the capital value of 
vessels and equipment was offset by the 
soaring capital value of licences and quota. By 
2003, the capital value of licences and quotas 
reached $1.8 billion (See Table 2). Vessels and 
equipment now make up only 14 percent of 
the capitalization in the B.C. fishing industry. 
In the past, the problem was too many 
fishermen chasing too few fish, but today it 
has become too much money chasing too few 
fish. Overcapitalization in licence and quota 
has become the problem, especially in terms of 
social equity. 
 
FISHING FOR MILLIONAIRES 
 
Expensive fishing licences and quotas are now 
becoming increasingly concentrated in fewer 
and fewer hands. The number of fishermen 
owning only one licence in B.C. declined from 
43 percent in 1994 to 35 percent in 2002.31   
 
The extremely high market value of licence 
and quota is well outside the reach of rural 
working families, First Nations and younger 
fishermen. Increasingly, B.C.’s fishery is being 
divided between quota and licence holders and 
tenant crews and skippers, that is, working 
fishermen who must lease licences and quota 
in order to go commercial fishing. Most people 
simply don’t have the capital necessary to buy 
quotas or licences. 
 
This inequity will become especially acute in 
the next decade as aging fishermen retire and 
either lease their quotas and licences or sell 
them to the highest bidder. At one time, a 
young fisherman could earn the money 
needed to invest in the fishery by working as 
a deckhand on a fish boat and being mentored 
into the industry at the same time. Today, that 
is not a possibility. A fisherman now needs to 
be a millionaire to enter into most fisheries. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Canada’s public fisheries resources are being 
bought, sold and traded in a highly 
unregulated, speculative market through 
private brokers and quota registries acting as 
fish stock exchanges. There is a complete lack 
of transparency and accountability in the 
ownership system. Trading and leasing is 
often done privately, without DFO’s 
knowledge and even contrary to licensing 
policy. Prices and lease costs are unmonitored.  
 
'Canada’s public fisheries 
resources are being bought, 
sold and traded in a highly 
unregulated, speculative 
market through private 
brokers and quota registries 
acting as fish stock 
exchanges.' 
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There is no transparent, public registry or 
regulated exchange whereby individuals and 
companies can obtain information on the 
ownership of fisheries resources. While 
publicly traded corporations are subjected to 
certain ownership regulations and disclosure 
rules, Canada’s public fisheries resources, by 
comparison, are not. Ownership of real estate 
is also subjected to strict disclosure rules in 
stark contrast to fisheries. 
 
Furthermore, there are no national standards 
for licensing policy and especially IFQ 
programs, protecting crew and community 
benefits and limiting consolidation of the 
industry and mitigating against other negative 
impacts of IFQs. Ottawa has taken a laissez-
faire approach to licensing policy, abdicating 
its role in establishing basic standards 
regarding socio-economic benefits to society 
as a whole and limits on corporate 
concentration in the industry. 
 
In the United States, legislation is currently 
being proposed and debated on the 
introduction of new IFQs and the need for 
national standards to mitigate the negative 
impacts of IFQs including increased 
management costs, industry consolidation, 
loss of rural community ownership, unfair 
allocations, exclusion of crew and skipper 
interests, among others. Canada needs to 
embark on a similar discussion regarding the 
expansion of IFQs in the Pacific fishery. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 1: PUBLIC REGISTRY 
DFO should establish a public registry that 
would ensure full disclosure of ownership and 
market values of licences and quota. 
Fishermen would be required to register all 
their leases, trades and sales of licences and 
quota, and fully disclose financial interests in 
the assets. The registry would allow the 
government, industry and public to monitor 
ownership and capital trends in the industry 
and to help protect against corporate 
concentration and overcapitalization.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 2: NATIONAL 
STANDARDS 
DFO should establish national standards for 
fishing licence and quota programs that would 
reduce overcapitalization in licences and 
quota, protect working crews from bearing the 
costs of quota leases, address unresolved First 
Nations rights, ensure that fair economic 
benefits are shared amongst various 
stakeholders and limit excessive consolidation 
and corporate concentration in the industry. 
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CHAPTER 4 
social impacts: net loss to 
fishing communities 
 
Fisheries are extremely important and 
valuable to coastal communities and First 
Nations whose economies are partially 
fishing-dependent and whose identity and 
culture are tied directly to fishing.  
 
Not surprisingly, the decline of coastal 
resource industries, especially forestry and 
fishing, has adversely affected coastal 
communities more than other regions of the 
province. Statistics from the 2001 Census 
show that rural communities—those outside 
the Capital Region, Greater Vancouver and 
Nanaimo—have experienced the largest 
population decline in modern history, a drop 
of 2.6 percent in only five years.32 Some 
communities lost more than a quarter of their 
populations in this same period. In fact, an 
index of human economic hardship in 2003 
showed that the North Coast and West Coast 
of Vancouver Island are the poorest regions in 
B.C.33  
 
SOCIOECONOMIC NEEDS 
 
The major restructuring and rationalization of 
the fishing industry in the 1990s exacerbated 
the poor economic conditions in many 
communities. The objectives of fisheries policy 
focused on the economic viability of industry 
stakeholders (primarily licence and quota 
holders and processing companies), with little 
regard for, and only limited analysis of, 
regional or community impacts.  
 
This was especially true of programs to 
privatize fisheries through IFQs. In assessing 
the first five years of the halibut IFQ program, 
DFO focused on the impacts on biological 
management, economic efficiency, crew 
employment and enforcement and 
administration. There was no mention of 
community or regional impacts.34 IFQ 
programs, in fact, are not designed to increase 
the viability of rural or Aboriginal 
economies—and can even be detrimental to 
traditional fishing communities. 35  
 
The growing capitalization in fisheries in the 
1990s has excluded many individuals from the 
fishing industry. Since investment and 
economic opportunities are limited and have 
declined significantly in resource-dependent 
communities over the last decade, urban-
based fishermen and corporations have 
successfully outbid rural and Aboriginal 
fishermen to buy up commercial fishing 
privileges. The result has been a 
disproportionate loss of licences and quota in 
rural communities, and a disconnection 
between communities and their adjacent 
aquatic resources on the B.C. coast.  
 
MARGINALIZING RURAL COMMUNITIES 
 
In Canada, household incomes are lower in 
rural communities, defined as areas with a 
population under 10,000. In fact, rural 
families have had the lowest average incomes 
compared to families living in communities 
with a population of 100,000 or more for three 
decades.36 Furthermore, residential home 
values in Greater Vancouver are twice as high 
as on Vancouver Island and three times as 
high as Northern B.C.37 Home equity is an 
important source of capital for fishermen, 
because commercial lenders do not accept a 
fishing licence as collateral since it is not 
legally a form of property. Fishermen 
therefore often use the equity in their homes 
'The major restructuring and 
rationalization of the fishing 
industry exacerbated the poor 
economic conditions in many 
rural communities.' 
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to borrow money to buy fishing licences. 
Because of lower incomes, limited economic 
opportunities and lower property values, rural 
families have less access to capital than their 
urban counterparts.  
 
As fishing licence values increased, and 
catches declined, many rural and Aboriginal 
fishermen have sold out of the fishery through 
government-funded buyback programs. Others 
have simply sold out to fellow fishermen who 
stacked multiple licences and quota on a 
single vessel. With few exceptions the loss of 
licences has been more pronounced in rural 
areas than in urban areas. Between 1994 and 
2002, 540 licences have been lost from rural 
communities as a result of fleet downsizing 
and the movement of major commercial 
fishing licences (excluding herring) to urban 
areas. That’s almost half (45 percent) of all 
shellfish, groundfish and salmon fishing 
licences owned by rural people. The decline in 
urban coastal regions was only 30 percent. 
(See Table 4) 
 
The downsizing of the salmon fishery through 
a government buyback of licences represented 
the largest loss of licences in rural and urban 
regions. Taking this into account, the number 
of non-salmon licences declined by 28 percent 
in rural communities compared to only five 
percent in urban regions. Even fisheries that 
have traditionally been based in small 
communities declined. According to DFO, 
“more than 84 percent of prawn licence 
holders live in smaller coastal communities 
outside of major metropolitan areas. Their 
incomes make an important contribution to 
local economies.”38 Between 1994 and 2002, 
however, the number of prawn licences in 
communities with a population of less than 
10,000 people declined by 58 percent. With 
only two exceptions,39 the rationalization and 
restructuring of fisheries has been 
significantly more detrimental to rural regions  
 
TABLE 4: Loss of Licences from Rural Fishing Communities, 1994-2002 
 
Fishery License
Rural Licences
1994
Rural Licences
2002
Rural % 
change 
Urban %
Change
Salmon Gillnet & Troll A 707 329 -53% -47%
Salmon Seine AS 95 30 -68% -44%
Schedule II Species by Hook and Line C 112 94 -16% -1%
Geoduck G 4 3 -25% 6%
Halibut L 59 50 -15% 4%
Crab R 50 29 -42% 13%
Shrimp S 17 30 76% -8%
Sablefish K 2 2 0% 0%
Groundfish Trawl T 3 6 100% -2%
Prawn W 53 22 -58% 12%
Green Sea Urchin ZA 6 1 -83% -43%
Red Sea Urchin ZC 19 13 -32% -41%
Sea Cucumber ZD 16 10 -38% -28%
Rockfish Hook and Line ZN 56 42 -25% -10%
Total - 1199 659 -45% - 30%
SOURCE: Data from DFO Pacific Fishery Licence Unit 
Because of lower incomes, 
limited economic opportunities 
and lower property values, 
rural families have less access 
to capital than their urban 
counterparts. 
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TABLE 5: First Nation Ownership of B.C. Fishing Licences, 2003 
 
 
 
 
Licence 
Communal
Licences
Reduced 
Fee
Licences
NNC / 
Other
Licences 
Full-Fee 
Licences
Native 
Held
Total 
Licences
% 
Native 
Held
Salmon (Seine) AS 12 18 50 80 276 29%
Salmon (Gillnet) AG 76 164 254 42 536 1406 38%
Salmon (Troll) AT 19 24 0 7 50 539 9%
Herring (Gillnet) HG 27 325 2 354 1256 28%
Herring (Seine) HS 1 51 11 63 252 25%
Spawn on Kelp J 11 15 11 36 46 78%
Halibut L 26  27 53 435 12%
Sablefish K 1  1 2 48 4%
Groundfish Trawl T    5 5 142 4%
Rockfish ZN 14  5 19 262 7%
Sardine JS 25  4 29 50 58%
Eulachon ZU    2 2 16 13%
Schedule II C 8  12 20 541 4%
Crab R 9  2 11 222 5%
Prawn W 5  4 9 252 4%
Geoduck G    1 1 55 2%
Red Sea Urchin ZC 6 7 1 14 110 13%
Sea Cucumber ZD   5 5 10 85 12%
Shrimp S 11  4 15 246 6%
Krill - 1  1 2 19 11%
Total  279 907 281 199 1666 6258 27%
SOURCE: James, Michelle. Native Participation in British Columbia Commercial Fisheries—2003. Victoria: Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, November 2003. 
FIGURE 4: Loss of Major Commerical Fishing Licences 
in B.C. Coastal Communities 1994-2002
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NOTE: Licence numbers do no include Z2 clam licences or HG herring gillnet licence. 
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than to urban regions.  
 
BARRIERS TO ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 
 
First Nations face more obstacles in buying 
fishing licences and quota than non-native 
fishermen. According to the 1996 Census, 
incomes for Aboriginal people are 35 percent 
lower than the B.C. average and 
unemployment is double.40 Many native people 
living on Indian reserves do not have fee-
simple ownership of their homes either; thus, 
they cannot tap their home equity to borrow 
money to buy fishing licences or quota.  
 
As a result, native ownership of full-fee 
commercial licences has declined 
precipitously. There are only 199 full-fee 
commercial licences owned by native 
individuals in B.C. (excluding clams, which 
has been traditionally a low-value, labour-
intensive fishery and is currently a non-
transferable licence). That is only three percent 
of all commercial licences. Through non-
transferable native licences (including “A-I” 
which are reduced fee licences held by status 
Indians, “N” licences held by the Northern 
Native Fishing Corporation and “F” licences 
held communally by bands) the number 
climbs to almost 27 percent. These special 
provisions have stemmed the movement of 
licences leaving Aboriginal communities. This 
is particularly true in the salmon fishery.  
 
The Northern Native Fishing Corporation 
(NNFC) holds 254 gillnet licences, about half 
of all native licences in that gear type in the 
North Coast. As a result, First Nations hold 38 
percent of all commercial licences in the 
gillnet fishery coastwide. This contrasts 
sharply with troll licences. The NNFC holds no 
troll licences and there are relatively few 
communal licences, leading to very low native 
participation in the fishery, about nine 
percent.  
 
A spatial analysis of salmon licence ownership 
depicted on coastal maps (See Appendix A) 
illustrates the important role the NNFC has 
played in protecting rural and Aboriginal 
ownership of salmon licences. Some 49 
percent of North Coast gillnet salmon licences 
are held in North Coast communities. The 
number for northern troll licences is 27 
percent and for northern seine licences only 
11 percent.  
 
The NNFC, based in Prince Rupert, increased 
its holdings from 100 licences in 1994 to 254 
in 2002, which means the total number of 
commercial licences for Prince Rupert was 482 
in 1994 and 467 in 2002, a decline of only 
three percent. The increase in NNFC-owned 
licences masks the otherwise drastic decline in 
local licence ownership in the North Coast. 
Excluding Prince Rupert (where the NNFC is 
based), the number of salmon licences in 
northern rural communities dropped from 299 
in 1994 to 142 in 2002, a 53 percent decline. 
 
The high level of capitalization in IFQ fisheries 
and the poorer economic status of First 
Nations mean relatively few IFQ licences 
(halibut, sablefish, groundfish trawl, sea 
cucumbers and urchins) are owned by 
Aboriginal people. Less than five percent of 
full-fee commercial IFQ licences are held by 
First Nations individuals. When communal 
and reduced fee IFQ licences are included, 
ownership of IFQ fisheries doubles to 10 
percent. 
 
'The high level of 
capitalization in IFQ fisheries 
and the poorer economic 
status of First Nations mean 
aboriginal people own 
relatively few IFQ licences.' 
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Given the economic challenges facing 
Aboriginal communities, including lower 
incomes, limited employment opportunities on 
reserve and lack of home equity, the 
participation of native people in the West 
Coast fishery would have declined even more 
without the NNFC and other protective 
measures such as communal ownership. These 
non-transferable native licences represent a 
form of community-based ownership and are 
an exception to DFO’s commercial licensing 
policy.  
 
UNDERMINING THE ADJACENCY PRINCIPLE 
 
One of the effects of the shift in licence 
ownership is that many rural communities and 
First Nations see few benefits accruing from 
adjacent fisheries resources. The West Coast of 
Vancouver Island, stretching from Barkley 
Sound to Kyuquot Sound, is a case in point. 
Spatial analysis of the residency of licence 
owners shows that very few fishermen in this 
region own fishing licences. Yet the sparsely 
populated region is one of the most productive 
and diverse marine ecosystems in the world, 
supporting high catches of groundfish, 
shellfish, salmon and other species. By and 
large, ownership of licences and quota to fish 
on the West Coast resides with individuals 
who live outside the region.  
 
Local residents and First Nations own only 11 
(2 percent) of all groundfish quota licences, 
including groundfish trawl, halibut and 
sablefish. IFQs are capital-intensive fisheries 
and thus are less likely to be owned by 
residents of rural communities. On the West 
Coast of Vancouver Island, only two percent 
(23) of all B.C. quota licences are owned 
locally compared to four percent of non-quota 
licences. This is also true on the North Island 
and North Coast, where only three and nine 
percent of quota licenses are held, 
respectively.  
 
The opposite is true in urban areas. Almost 44 
percent of all quota licences are held in the 
metropolitan regions of Victoria and 
Vancouver. The portion of non-quota licences 
held in these metropolitan regions is slightly 
lower at 40 percent. In other words, individual 
fishing quotas tend to be more concentrated in 
metropolitan areas than non-quota fisheries. 
 
By way of example, a spatial analysis of the 
landed value and ownership of geoduck quota 
shows how an IFQ fishery is concentrated in 
urban areas and how disconnected rural 
TABLE 6: Ownership of Major Fishing Licences on the West Coast of 
Vancouver Island (WCVI) 2002 
 
 
Fishery License  
Total 
Licences
WCVI-based
Licences
% WCVI-based 
licences
Salmon Gillnet AG 1405 10 0.7%
Salmon Troll AT 539 55 10.2%
Salmon Seine AS 276 0 0.0%
Groundfish Trawl T 142 2 1.4%
Halibut L 436 9 2.1%
Sablefish K 48 0 0.0%
Geoduck G 55 2 3.6%
Crab R 222 14 6.3%
Shrimp S 247 14 5.7%
Prawn W 251 11 4.4%
Rockfish Hook and Line ZN 262 12 4.6%
Total  3,883 129 3.3%
SOURCE: Data from DFO Pacific Fishery Licence Unit 
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communities have become to their adjacent 
aquatic resources. On the West Coast of 
Vancouver Island, only two of 12 licences to 
harvest geoducks in this region are owned by 
local residents. The situation is worse in the 
North Coast. Although $23 million in 
geoducks were harvested in the North Coast 
region in 2002, local residents only owned 
two of 36 quota licences.  In a region that is  
suffering population loss and economic 
depression, most of the profits from the 
geoduck fishery went to individuals or 
companies outside the North Coast. 
 
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 
 
Many licences in urban areas are owned by 
companies or individuals who effectively act 
as “absentee landlords” in that they lease their 
quotas or licences to tenant fishermen. 
Leasing is usually done through private, 
contractual agreements and so there is little or 
no data available on how widespread the 
practice is. There is, however, some data on 
corporate ownership of fishing licences. 
 
In B.C., the largest corporate entity in fisheries 
is the Canadian Fishing Company (Canfisco), 
which owned 244 licences in various fisheries 
in 2002. The total market value of Canfisco’s 
licences and quota is approximately $105 
million. Jim Pattison Group, which also owns 
Overwaitea Food Group with 100 stores and 
Buy-Low Foods with 26 stores in Western 
Canada, owns Canfisco. 
 
Canfisco is a large owner of the B.C. seine 
fleet. It directly owns one-third of all herring 
seine licences and 20 percent of all salmon 
seine licences. It is the largest canner of 
salmon in Canada and the largest roe herring 
exporter. Canfisco is dominant in these 
fisheries and is vertically integrated from the 
sea to the shopping cart.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7: Canfisco Ownership of B.C. 
Fishing Licences in B.C., 2002 
Licence Number 
Estimated
Market Value
Salmon Gillnet (AG) 3  $           248,301 
Salmon Seine (AS) 90  $      32,569,200 
Herring Gillnet (HG) 81  $      11,385,684 
Herring Seine (HS) 51  $      36,182,562 
Sablefish (K) * 1 $       3,159,550 
Halibut (L) * 9  $      7,385,764 
Groundfish Trawl (T) * 7  $      13,765,958 
Other 2 -
 Total 244   $     104,697,027 
* Estimated market value for groundfish licences calculated as 
average values per quota licence in fishery. 
SOURCE: Licence numbers from DFO licensing database (2002) 
and prices are from Nelson Bros Fisheries Ltd. Licence Values in 
the Pacific Fishing Fleet, report prepared for DFO, March 31, 
2003. 
COMMUNITY-BASED CLAM FISHERY 
 
The wild clam (Z2 licence) fishery is a good
example of a rural, community-based fishery.
In 1998, licence limitation was introduced into
the South Coast commercial clam fishery,
reducing the number of clam harvesters to
approximately 1,165. Clam licences are non-
transferable, meaning harvesters cannot sell
these licenses freely. In addition, DFO
established a community management board
on the West Coast of Vancouver Island (Area F)
to allow for greater involvement of the local
communities in the management of the fishery.
Native people hold almost 57 percent of all Z2
intertidal clam licences and rural ownership—at
approximately 30 percent—is one of the highest
participation rates of rural people in
commercial fisheries in B.C. On the West Coast
of Vancouver Island, more than 85 percent of
the 337 clam licences (237 Aboriginal
communal and 100 regular clam licenses) are
held locally, illustrating the local retention of
non-transferable fishing rights and their
associated economic opportunities.  
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SOCIAL INEQUITY 
 
Growing corporate concentration, absentee 
landlords and dwindling licence ownership in 
rural regions is indicative of a fundamental 
shift occurring in Pacific fisheries. The very 
measures that were meant to improve the 
economics of fishing have, in fact, 
undermined the viability of many rural and 
Aboriginal fishing communities. The 
rationalization and restructuring of the West 
Coast fishing industry has impacted them 
disproportionately. In effect, fisheries policy, 
whether intentional or not, is skewed in 
favour of urban-based corporations and 
individuals with greater access to capital and 
economic opportunities. Fishermen in those 
rural communities most dependent on fishing 
are being bid out of the fishery. 
 
Leasing, consolidation and the loss of licences 
in rural communities will likely become worse 
in the next decade as the current generation of 
fishermen retires. These fishermen will either 
sell their fishing privileges to the highest 
bidder or simply lease their licences and quota 
and thereby earn revenues throughout their 
retirement. This will make it increasingly 
difficult for young fishermen (new entrants) to 
own commercial fishing privileges.  
 
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has 
singled out this inequity as a problem. In a 
report to Congress, the GAO stated that IFQ 
programs have “raised concerns about the 
fairness of initial quota allocations, the 
increased costs for fishermen to gain entry, 
and the loss of employment and revenues in 
communities that have historically depended 
on fishing.” 41  The GAO outlined a series of 
measures that could protect community 
interests and facilitate new entrants in IFQ 
fisheries. Without similar measures in B.C. 
fisheries, social inequity will grow as fewer 
individuals gain greater access to and benefits 
from fisheries resources. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Governments can protect the next generation 
of fishermen by implementing measures to 
facilitate new entrants into fisheries and 
safeguard the interests of First Nations and 
coastal communities through a number of 
innovative policies. These measures, outlined 
by the GAO report, include:42 
 
• Buying back quota in order to re-
allocate it to younger, professional 
fishermen 
• Issuing quota for a fixed period of 
time 
• Setting aside increases in the total 
allowable catch for new entrants 
• Providing financial assistance for new 
entrants to buy quota and licences 
• Prohibiting quota and licence sales, 
making them non-transferable 
• Placing geographic restrictions on 
quota and licence transfers 
• Setting limits on the amount of quota 
or licences an individual or entity can 
hold 
• Requiring quota and licence holders to 
be onboard their vessels when fish are 
caught  
• Restricting the ports to which quota 
can be landed 
'The GAO found that IFQ 
programs have “raised 
concerns about the fairness of 
initial quota allocations, the 
increased costs for fishermen to 
gain entry, and the loss of 
employment and revenues in 
communities that have 
historically depended on 
fishing.” ' 
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• Creating separate quota markets for 
large and small vessels 
• Giving communities the right of first 
refusal to buy licences and quota 
 
Most countries with IFQ programs have 
recognized the detrimental effect of fisheries 
privatization on social equity and have 
introduced many of these provisions. These 
countries include Iceland, Norway, Scotland, 
New Zealand and the United States.  
 
In Canada, DFO has granted special licences 
and quotas to protect First Nations interests 
and in 1997 established the Groundfish 
Development Authority (GDA), a non-profit 
society consisting of labour and community 
interests which advises the Minister of 
Fisheries on the allocation of 20 percent of the 
TAC. The allocation advice involves processors 
and quota holders jointly applying for quota 
from the GDA. However, the complex and 
weighted formula, on which allocations are 
based, limits the actual influence of 
community and labour interests over the 
allocations. 
 
In assessing the suite of options available to 
fisheries managers, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office concluded that the “easiest 
and most direct way to help protect 
communities under an IFQ program is to allow 
the communities themselves to hold quota.”43 
In June 2001, the U.S. North Pacific Fishery 
Management Council recognized the fact that 
a number of small coastal communities “are 
struggling to remain economically viable” and 
that “[a]llowing qualifying communities to 
purchase halibut and sablefish quota share for 
use by community residents will help 
minimize adverse economic impacts on these 
small, remote, coastal communities in 
Southeast and Southcentral Alaska, and help 
provide for the sustained participation of these 
communities in the halibut and sablefish IFQ 
fisheries.”44 
 
In April 2004, U.S. federal fisheries regulations 
were amended to allow 42 rural communities 
with a population of less than 1,500 people 
and with historic participation in the fisheries 
to establish non-profit Community Quota 
Entities (CQEs) to hold and lease quota for 
local residents. The Alaskan state government 
provided CQEs with up to $2 million (U.S.) in 
loans to purchase quotas.  
 
This program comes on the heels of Alaska’s 
successful Community Development Quota 
program, which granted a portion of Alaska’s 
pollock fishery to rural communities. Since 
1992, the CDQ program has generated $110 
million (U.S.) in wages, education and training 
benefits for over 25,000 residents of Bering 
Sea communities, $500 million (U.S.) in 
revenues and $260 million (U.S.) in asset 
value for six CDQ groups. The CDQ program 
has funded docks, harbours, seafood 
processing facilities, the acquisition of equity 
ownership in the pollock, Pacific cod and crab 
fisheries, and local economic development 
projects.45 The program has received 
widespread, bipartisan support in Alaska. 
 
Without similar measures to protect rural 
fishing communities and First Nations in B.C., 
ownership of fisheries licences and quota by 
local residents will continue to dwindle, 
adding to the downward economic spiral of 
coastal communities.  
'The GAO concluded that the 
“easiest and most direct way 
to help protect communities 
under an IFQ program is to 
allow the communities 
themselves to hold quota.” ' 
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RECOMMENDATION 3: COMMUNITY QUOTA 
ENTITIES 
DFO in partnership with provincial, municipal 
and First Nation governments should permit 
the establishment of and provide funding for 
Community Quota Entities, which would be 
non-profit societies established to hold 
fisheries licences and quota in trust for 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal rural fishing 
communities. The CQEs would lease fishing 
privileges to local fishermen and facilitate new 
entrants, i.e. the next generation, into the 
industry. The CQE program would be modelled 
on a similar program established in Alaska, 
including government-funded loans of up to 
$2 million for each CQE.  
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Chapter 5 
ecological impacts: 
selling out conservation 
 
Assessing the impacts of federal fisheries 
licensing policy on conservation is a difficult 
and complex task. Many factors, including 
habitat degradation, ocean survival rates and 
climate change, affect fish stocks. 
Nevertheless, fisheries licensing policy does 
play an important role in providing incentives 
and disincentives to fishermen to conserve 
fish stocks.  
 
Fisheries licensing policy can take the form of 
input or output controls. Input controls limit 
the number of vessels, type and amount of 
gear, fishing methods, length of vessels and 
fishing season and permitted fishing areas. 
Output controls limit the amount of catch that 
can be taken out of the sea, which are usually 
set as annual TACs. An IFQ system can be 
both an input and output control. Quotas limit 
the amount of fish an individual fisherman 
can catch (an output control), but by making 
quotas transferable and stackable, the number 
of vessels fishing is often reduced (an input 
control) through fleet rationalization. 
 
CONSERVATION RECORD 
 
The conservation record of IFQ programs is 
mixed. By ending the race for the fish and 
rationalizing fishing fleets, they have helped 
fisheries managers control over-harvesting, 
ensuring that landings do not exceed TACs. 
For instance since the introduction of IFQs in 
the B.C. halibut fishery in 1991, the catch has 
been slightly lower than the TAC each year.46 
The Alaskan IFQ programs in halibut and 
sablefish were also successful at eliminating 
the frenzied derby fishery, improving crew 
safety and reducing waste resulting from 
ghost fishing by gear lost at sea.47 
 
Still, IFQs can induce unsustainable behaviour 
by fishermen, including quota busting, 
discarding, poaching, high grading of catch 
and data fouling.48 These problems can be 
solved in part by onboard and dockside 
observers, but add considerable costs to 
fishing operations.  
 
A 1997 global study by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
found that 24 of 37 IFQ fisheries surveyed 
were experiencing varying degrees of stock 
decline.49 One investigation of New Zealand 
fisheries under IFQ management found that in 
1998, of the 187 stocks managed under IFQ 
programs, only 25 had stock assessments and 
of those 13 were below the biomass that 
would support maximum sustainable yield.50 
 
The impact of IFQs on fisheries conservation 
in B.C. is equally inconclusive. The first IFQ 
program introduced in B.C. was in the abalone 
fishery in 1979, which closed in 1990 and 
remains closed today for conservation 
concerns. Catches in the geoduck, urchin and 
sea cucumber IFQ fisheries have remained 
stable, and increased in some cases. Catches of 
halibut have remained stable, though some 
First Nations claim that local depletions are 
considerable.51 Catches in the sablefish IFQ 
program have been declining since the early 
1990s. Since the introduction of IFQs in 1997, 
the groundfish trawl industry has had steady 
catches, although the hake fishery collapsed in 
2000 and then bounced back a few years later. 
 
A 1997 global study by the 
Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
found that 24 of 37 IFQ 
fisheries surveyed were 
experiencing varying degrees 
of stock decline. 
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One of the reasons why the conservation 
record of privatization is mixed, according to 
a major fisheries study by the U.S. National 
Research Council, is in part because “IFQs are 
not a conservation tool, they’re mainly an 
economic tool to control overcapitalization 
and ‘the race for fish’. The TAC and other 
management measures are the main 
conservation tools in IFQ systems.”52  
 
Setting a scientifically defensible and 
sustainable TAC is one of the most important 
fisheries conservation measures and is critical 
to the success of IFQ programs. Yet in B.C., 
only eight of 64 groundfish stocks are 
assessed in a given year—even though most of 
the stocks are under quota systems. Similarly, 
less than 50 percent of salmon stocks are 
assessed, and of these only a few are assessed 
or managed to a point where a TAC could be 
set and monitored in-season.  
 
Furthermore, fisheries privatization through 
IFQs raises fundamental problems about how 
sustainable catch levels are set. 
 
OVERCAPITALIZATION JEOPARDY 
 
As outlined in this report, IFQs have reduced 
overcapitalization in fishing capacity in B.C. 
by reducing the number of working vessels, 
but licences and quota market values have 
soared. Overall, capitalization in the fishing 
fleet has actually increased. In the past, the 
problem was “too many fishermen chasing too 
few fishermen.” Today, with market values for 
quota and licences at unprecedented levels, 
the problem could become “too much money 
chasing too few fish.” 
 
The growing capitalization in fisheries licences 
and quota has serious long-term implications 
for conservation. Although the soaring price 
of quota and licences represents a “windfall 
profit” to those initially granted them, it 
represents a capital cost that will have to be 
borne by new entrants into fisheries, once 
current fishermen retire. This enormous 
financial cost will put pressure on future 
fishermen to catch more fish and to apply 
political pressure on DFO and/or industry-
funded scientists to maintain high catch 
levels.  
 
Declines in fish stock biomass, even as a result 
of natural fluctuations in ocean productivity, 
could result in lower catches and create 
financial difficulty for fishermen who are 
overcapitalized. Obviously, those fishermen 
will be under enormous financial pressure to 
lobby to maintain current catch levels, despite 
the long-term jeopardy this could cause for 
the fishery. 
 
UNDUE INDUSTRY INFLUENCE 
 
Past over-fishing has often been attributed to 
undue influence of industry stakeholders, as 
the Auditor General pointed out in its 1986 
report on fisheries. This was certainly true of 
the Atlantic cod fishery. Privatization through 
IFQs and the establishment of co-management 
agreements with exclusive groups of licence 
and quota holders is likely to increase the 
influence of industry stakeholders, while 
marginalizing conservation, community and 
citizen groups in fisheries management. DFO’s 
concept of co-management focuses on narrow, 
economic interests in fisheries, negating social 
and conservation values represented by non-
industry groups. 
 
According to one assessment of the quota 
management system in New Zealand, “ITQs in 
combination with ‘cost recovery’ has distorted 
'Today, with market values for 
quota and licences at 
unprecedented levels, the 
problem could become “too 
much money chasing too few 
fish.”' 
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perceptions of the legitimacy of quota owners 
compared to recreational fishers, the 
environment, the other non-extractive values 
and uses of the environment.”53 Their 
economic clout has given them “a 
disproportionate voice” and allowed quota 
owners to engineer “the evolution of 
institutions to further enhance their power and 
control and to marginalise other interests.” In 
British Columbia, a similar system dominated 
by licence and quota holders is being 
established to manage fisheries. 
 
PRIVATIZING SCIENCE 
 
Full-cost recovery for data collection by 
private companies also raises questions about 
the ownership of fisheries data and the 
transparency of fisheries management and 
science. Already, the Marine Conservation 
Caucus, a DFO advisory process for 
environmental groups, has run into serious 
problems accessing data on the groundfish 
industry and has withdrawn from DFO’s 
groundfish consultation process as a result. 
The lack of access to data has hampered the 
efforts of independent scientists to scrutinize 
DFO science and decision-making. There’s also 
concern that privileged access to data by 
certain industry consultants has strengthened 
at least the perception of biased science. 
 
While it is important to incorporate the 
traditional knowledge of fishermen into stock 
assessment, there are serious concerns about 
having industry pay for and carry out data 
collection and stock assessment and act as 
exclusive co-managers of the resource. Short-
term profits could win out over long-term 
sustainability in the fishery. 
 
HABITAT PROTECTION 
 
The shifting nature of the ownership of 
fisheries may also have serious implications 
for fisheries habitat protection and restoration. 
This is especially true of the salmon fishery, 
since the anadromous species is highly 
dependent on terrestrial habitat for its 
survival. According to one group of fisheries 
experts, the move to an IFQ fishery in salmon 
“takes the economic benefit of fisheries out of 
coastal communities, removing the incentive 
for local residents to protect critical salmon 
habitat.”54 Without access to the commercial 
salmon fishery, communities will lose their 
economic incentive to protect and restore 
streams and rivers for their local salmon runs. 
 
Habitat protection is also vitally important for 
rockfish and sea corals. DFO is currently 
promoting the integration of all groundfish 
fisheries, including trawl (T), halibut (L), 
sablefish (K), rockfish (ZN) and Schedule II (C) 
licences, into a single IFQ system. Under a 
fully integrated system, quotas could be 
transferred between gear types: trap, hook and 
line and trawl. This could further rationalize 
the fishing fleet as large, efficient trawlers buy 
out smaller hook-and-line operators. This 
would have adverse impacts for conservation 
considering the impact trawlers have on 
seafloor habitat.  
 
Bottom trawls constitute one of the most 
invasive methods of fishing and the rate of 
habitat alteration of the seafloor has been 
calculated at more than 150 times the rate of 
global deforestation by clear-cutting.55 Coastal 
communities would also suffer from decreased 
employment, since so few trawlers are based 
in rural and Aboriginal communities.  
 
'Without access to the 
commercial salmon fishery, 
communities will lose their 
economic incentive to protect 
and restore streams and rivers 
for their local salmon runs.' 
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In both the salmon and groundfish fisheries, 
licensing policy must provide economic 
incentives for habitat restoration and 
protection. Yet there has been little research so 
far in B.C. linking biological and socio-
economic fisheries data. The authors believe 
that understanding these links is necessary in 
designing sustainable fisheries and believe 
that further research should be a priority for 
government in reforming the groundfish and 
salmon fisheries.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
IFQs are about economic efficiency: bigger 
boats and fewer licence and quota holders 
earning higher profits and wielding greater 
influence over fisheries. With privatization, 
the resource is eventually sold to the highest 
bidder, those with the deepest pockets. The 
soaring capitalization in licences and quota, 
and resulting debt load, threatens the resource 
by putting pressure on new entrants to catch 
more fish. At the same time, the 
disenfranchisement of rural and Aboriginal 
communities adjacent to fisheries resources 
undermines the stewardship role these 
communities could play in promoting fisheries 
conservation and especially protecting 
fisheries habitat in the case of salmon.  
 
Fisheries co-management must be inclusive of 
diverse interests, accountable to the public 
and transparent in its decision-making. A mix 
of values, experience and interests must share 
the responsibility for fisheries. To limit co-
management to the narrow economic interests 
of exclusive groups of licence and quota 
holders is to effectively privatize a public 
resource. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 4: PUBLIC DATA 
DFO should establish a comprehensive data-
access policy that provides full and 
transparent access to biological and catch 
data. Public access to fisheries data would re-
build trust in DFO science, promote public 
accountability and ensure rigorous review of 
fisheries management by independent 
scientists and concerned citizens. Furthermore, 
all fisheries data funded and collected by 
private companies as part of IFQ fisheries 
should be placed in the public domain. 
  
RECOMMENDATION 5: FISHERIES CO-
MANAGEMENT 
DFO should ensure that diverse interests are 
represented in fisheries co-management 
agreements and harvesting committees 
including licence and quota holders, labour, 
processors, coastal communities, First Nations, 
environmentalists and other citizen groups. 
Furthermore, DFO should protect against the 
undue influence of licence and quota holders 
in the management of fisheries resources. 
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Chapter 6 
conclusion and 
recommendations 
 
Integrating ecological, economic and social 
values in fisheries management is paramount 
to conservation. Both human communities and 
marine ecosystems must be healthy for 
sustainability to occur.  
 
This report focuses on a fundamental paradox 
of Canadian fisheries policy. While the 
objective of several decades of reform and 
rationalization in the West Coast fishery has 
been to increase economic viability, it has had 
the opposite effect for communities. The 
privatization of B.C. fisheries has netted a 
catch-22. DFO’s solutions have become 
problematic, worsening overcapitalization in 
the fishing industry even in the face of 
declining stocks, undermining the 
sustainability of fishing-dependent 
communities and threatening long-term 
conservation.  
 
While some of the problems that have been 
created are difficult to reverse, immediate and 
tangible actions can be taken that will have 
substantial short and long-term benefits for 
communities and conservation.   
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1) Public Registry 
DFO should establish a public registry that 
would ensure full disclosure of ownership and 
market values of licences and quota. 
Fishermen would be required to register all 
their leases, trades and sales of licences and 
quota, and fully disclose financial interests in 
the assets. The registry would allow the 
government, industry and public to monitor 
ownership and capital trends in the industry 
and to help protect against corporate 
concentration and overcapitalization.  
 
2) National Standards 
DFO should establish national standards for 
fishing licence and quota programs that would 
reduce overcapitalization in licences and 
quota, protect working crews from bearing the 
costs of quota leases, address unresolved First 
Nations rights, ensure that fair economic 
benefits are shared amongst various 
stakeholders and limit excessive consolidation 
and corporate concentration in the industry. 
 
3) Community Quota Entities 
DFO in partnership with provincial, municipal 
and First Nation governments should permit 
the establishment of and provide funding for 
Community Quota Entities, which would be 
non-profit societies established to hold 
fisheries licences and quota in trust for 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal rural fishing 
communities. The CQEs would lease fishing 
privileges to local fishermen and facilitate new 
entrants, i.e. the next generation, into the 
industry. The CQE program would be modelled 
on a similar program established in Alaska, 
including government-funded loans of up to 
$2 million for each CQE.  
 
4) Public Data 
DFO should establish a comprehensive data-
access policy that provides full and 
transparent access to biological and catch 
data. Public access to fisheries data would 
re-build trust in DFO Science, promote 
public accountability and ensure rigorous 
review of fisheries management by 
independent scientists and concerned 
citizens. Furthermore, all fisheries data funded 
and collected by private companies as part of 
IFQ fisheries should be placed in the public 
domain. 
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5) Fisheries Co-management 
DFO should ensure that diverse interests are 
represented in fisheries co-management 
agreements and harvesting committees 
including licence and quota holders, labour, 
processors, coastal communities, First Nations, 
environmentalists and other citizen groups. 
Furthermore, DFO should protect against the 
undue influence of licence and quota holders 
in the management of fisheries resources. 
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Appendix A 
SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF THE OWNERSHIP OF B.C. SALMON LICENCES 
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 ecotrust index 
a quirky and quintessential snapshot of statistics 
 
 
Number of cows in Canada infected with mad cow disease: 1 
Number of jobs lost in Ucluelet surimi fish plant (which uses beef plasma) because of that cow: 350 
Value of geoduck clams harvested in B.C.’s North Coast in 2002: $25 million 
Number of geoduck fishing licences owned by residents in Prince Rupert in 2002: 0 
Number of geoduck licences owned by residents in the ski resort of Whistler in 2002: 1 
Probability that geoduck diving will be a demonstration sport at the 2010 Olympics in Whistler: 0 
Average market value of a geoduck fishing licence in B.C.: $3 million 
Price of “signature home” on Nicklaus North Golf Course in Whistler: $3 million 
New homes built in Prince Rupert in 1995: 74 
New homes built in Prince Rupert in 2003: 1 
GDP value of B.C. wild fisheries in 2002: $545 million 
GDP value of B.C. aquaculture in 2002: $205 million 
Amount (in metric tonnes) of farmed salmon produced in B.C. in 2002: 85,000 
Energy (in litres of diesel fuel) needed to produce one kilogram of Atlantic farmed salmon: 2.4 
Energy (in litres of diesel fuel) needed annually for B.C. farm salmon production: 205 million 
Estimated barrels of crude oil that could be extracted from the Queen Charlotte Basin: 1.3 billion 
Estimated number of years that B.C salmon farms could run on this crude oil: 1,000 
Estimated number of years the Haida have lived in the Queen Charlotte Basin: 12,000 
Number of B.C. commercial fishing licences owned by Jimmy Pattison’s Canfisco in 2002: 244 
Estimated value of Jimmy Pattison’s fishing licences and quota in 2003: $105 million 
Estimated value of Jimmy Pattison’s privately owned companies in 2003: $5.5 billion 
Number of guests that can dine comfortably on Pattison’s 150-foot yacht Nova Spirit: 30 
Percentage of Aboriginal adults in Alert Bay who fished for food in the past 12 months: 34 
Percentage of global production of seafood from aquaculture in 1970: 3.9 
Percentage of global production of seafood from aquaculture in 2000: 27.3 
Number of B.C. salmon gillnet licences owned by residents in Kyuquot in 2002: 0 
Number of gillnet licences owned by residents in Valley Center, California in 2002: 1 
Distance between Valley Center and BC’s salmon fishing grounds (in miles): 1,500 
Number of B.C. halibut licences owned by residents of Ahousat: 0 
Number of B.C. halibut licences owned by residents of Brooks, Alberta: 1 
Percentage of halibut licences owned or operated by First Nations in 1950: 28 
Percentage of halibut licences owned or operated by First Nations in 2003: 12 
Price of one pound of halibut in Toronto grocery store: $16.50 
Price of one pound of commercial halibut quota: $36.00 
Percentage of catch revenue from leased halibut quotas going to “arm chair” fishermen: ~70 
Number of working fishermen on disability leave or killed in B.C. in 2003: 347 
Number of “fishermen” injured or killed while sitting in arm chairs collecting quota revenue in 2003: 0 
 
 
  
SOURCES: BC Stats; GSGislason & Associates Ltd., British Columbia Seafood Sector and Tidal Water Recreational Fishing: A Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) Assessment; Worldwatch Institute, “Matters of Scale: September/ October 2003, Factory-Fish Farming”; Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans; Ecotrust Canada; Report on Business, April 2004; West Coast of Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Board; Peter Tyedmers, 
UBC School of Community and Regional Planning; Government of B.C.; Statistics Canada, 2001 Census, Aboriginal Population Community Profiles; 
Workers Compensation Board, Claim Statistics; Our Place at the Table: First Nations in the B.C. Fishery (2004). First Nation Panel on Fisheries, Aboriginal 
Fisheries Commission; Yachts International, May 2000; Whistler Real Estate Company, www.wrec.com; B.C. Offshore Oil and Gas Team. 
